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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW




Localism and regionalism are normally seen as
contrasting, indeed conflicting, conceptions of metropolitan
area governance. Localism in this context refers to the view
that the existing system of a large number of relatively
small governments wielding power over such critical
matters as local land use regulation, local taxation, and the
financing of local public services ought to be preserved. The
meaning of regionalism is less clearly defined and proposals
for regional governance vary widely, but most advocates of
regionalism would shift some authority from local
governments, restrict local autonomy, or, at the very least,
constrain the ability of local governments to pursue local
interests. Regionalism would move some power to
institutions, organizations, or procedural structures with a
larger territorial scope and more population than existing
local governments. Regionalism appears to be a step
towards centralization. As such, it seems to be the
antithesis of the decentralization represented by localism.
Yet, in the metropolitan areas that dominate America
at the end of the twentieth century, regionalism is not
simply the enemy of localism; it is also localism's logical
t Vice-Dean and Joseph P. Chamberlain Professor of Legislation, Columbia Law
School. B.A., Columbia University, 1974; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1977.
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extension. Localism is about the legal and political
empowerment of local areas. The theoretical case for
localism rests on a set of arguments about the role of local
governments in promoting governmental efficiency,
democracy, and community. But in contemporary
metropolitan areas, the economically, socially, and
ecologically relevant local area is often the region.
Consequently, in metropolitan areas, concerns about
efficiency, democracy, and community ought to lead to
support for some shift in power away from existing
localities to new processes, structures, or organizations that
can promote decision-making on behalf of the interests of a
region considered as a whole. Regionalism is, thus, localism
for metropolitan areas.
Of course, the congruence of the theoretical
underpinnings of localism and regionalism does not dispel
the real world conflict between them. Localists do not
become regionalists simply because they live in
metropolitan regions. Indeed, the resistance to regionalism
is quite widespread in most metropolitan areas. Localism is
not simply a theory of government intended to advance
certain normative goals. It is also a means of protecting the
interests of those who receive advantages from the existing
governance structure, including, but not limited to, local
government officials, businesses that reap the rewards of
the interlocal competition for commercial and industrial
activity, real estate interests that profit from the system's
propensity to promote the development of new land, and
residents of more affluent areas who enjoy the benefits of
ample local tax bases. The relationship between localism
and regionalism, and the intense localist resistance to
regionalism, tells us as much about the role of local self-
interest in promoting localism in practice-and, for that
matter, in promoting regionalism-as about the connection
between localist values and regionalism in theory.
This Article explores the relationship between localism
and regionalism. Part I examines the "what" and the "why"
of contemporary regionalism: What does regionalism mean
and why has it enjoyed so much attention from academics,
urbanists, and policy analysts in recent years? Part II
reviews the arguments for localism, and explains how,
despite the asserted conflict between localism and
regionalism, the theories underlying localism actually make
a case for regionalism in contemporary metropolitan areas.
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Finally, Part III considers the prospects in practice for
moving from localism to regionalism.
I. REGIONALISM: THE WHAT AND THE WHY
A. What is Regionalism?
In contemporary discussions, regionalism has three
elements. First, and most important, is the idea that a
region is a real economic, social, and ecological unit. A
metropolitan area is a real unit' in the sense that the people
who live there do not concentrate their daily lives within
any one locality but, rather, regularly move back and forth
among multiple municipalities across a region. A person
may live in one locality, work in another, shop in a third,
seek entertainment or engage in a cultural activity in a
fourth, and move through a large number of other localities
during the course of his or her daily rounds.2 Regions, not
the cities within them, function as labor markets and
housing markets,3 and businesses look to the region, rather
than to the localities in which they are located, for their
suppliers, workers and customers. Cultural and educational
institutions, like museums, orchestras, and universities,
serve broader regions than just their home cities.
Environmental and natural resource questions-like air
and water quality, water supply, waste disposal, or the
availability of open space-affect regions that transcend
local boundaries. If we think of a city or a locality as a
group of people living near each other, who have common
place-based interests, relatively high levels of interaction
with each other, and much less intense interactions with
residents of other cities, then in the words of David Rusk,
1. The Census Bureau defines a metropolitan area as a "geographic area
consisting of a large population nucleus together with adjacent communities
which have a high degree of economic and social integration with that nucleus."
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATE AND IETROPOLITAN
AREA DATA BOOK 1991, at 353 (1991).
2. See CARL ABBOTT, THE NEW URBAN AMERICA: GROWTH AND POLITICS IN
SUNBELT CITIES 186 (rev. ed. 1987) (quoting the statement of a Southern
California woman: "I live in Garden Grove, work in Irvine, shop in Santa Ana,
go to the dentist in Anaheim... and used to be president of the League of
Women Voters in Fullerton.").
3. See generally William N. Goetzmann, et al., Do Cities and Suburbs
Cluster?, 3 CrrYSCAPE: A J. OF POLY DEVEL. & RES. 193 (1998).
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"[t]he real city is the total metropolitan area. '
At the end of the twentieth century, the metropolitan
area is the dominant form of population settlement in
America. In 1990, 193 million people, or seventy-eight
percent of the total population of the United States, lived in
metropolitan areas.' The twenty-one most populous
metropolitan areas (those with two million people or more)
included 101 million people, or forty percent of the
population. Slightly more than half of all Americans in 1990
lived in the thirty-nine metropolitan areas that contained
one million people or more.' Composed of multiple local
governments, the metropolitan region falls between city
and state. It is usually far larger in area and population
than any of the local governments, particularly the
municipalities that lie within it.7 Yet, the metropolitan
region typically accounts for only a portion of the population
and land area in a state.8
Metropolitan regions usually lack formal legal or
political existence. They are generally not chartered,
incorporated, or granted home rule Not one major
metropolitan area is governed by a single all-encompassing
general-purpose government. In most metropolitan areas
there is no legal or political institution capable of
developing and implementing regional policies across a
wide range of matters of regional concerns. In many areas,
there are special purpose bodies capable of raising funds or
4. DAVID RuSK, CrrIES WrrHoUT SUBURBS 3 (2d ed. 19950; accord Neal
Peirce, Regionalism and Technology, 85 NAT'L CmC REV. 59, 59 (1996)
([Mletropolitan regions - 'citistates' are the true cities of our time.").
5. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 1, at 205.
6. See Eli Ginzberg, The Changing Urban Scene: 1960-1990 and Beyond, in
INTERWOVEN DESTINIES: CITIES AND THE NATION 33, 35-36 (Henry G. Cisneros
ed., 1993) [hereinafter "INTERWOVEN DESTINIES"].
7. According to Rusk, out of 320 metropolitan areas, there were only 48
areas, accounting for about eight million people, in which there was one local
government that encompassed at least sixty percent of the metropolitan
population. In only one metropolitan area was there a local government that
served the entire population. See RUSK, supra note 4, at 95.
8. Many metropolitan areas are not nested neatly within a single state but,
instead, sprawl across state lines. In 1990, 10 of the 30 most populous
metropolitan areas, and five of the ten largest, crossed state lines. See
INTERWOVEN DESTINIES, supra note 6, at 23, tbl. 2.
9. An important exception is the region around Portland, Oregon. The
Portland Metropolitan Service District received a home rule charter in 1992.
The District, however, is not a full-fledged general-purpose government. See
RUSE, supra note 4, at 104.
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delivering services across a region. But as former U.S.
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Henry G.
Cisneros once put it, these entities constitute a kind of
"things-regionalism" aimed at financing, constructing or
operating infrastructure facilities such as highways, mass
transit, ports and airports, water supply, and wastewater
treatment.' °  Their focus on "system-maintenance
functions"" tends to lead them to frame their missions
around engineering or technical questions, rather than the
broader economic and social issues implicated by the
location and operation of new facilities. Their single-
purpose specialization "constrains opportunities for
comprehensive regional policy discussions and tradeoffs." 2
These entities provide important services, but they
generally do not provide an opportunity to integrate
different public concerns, for example connecting location of
new roads or sewer lines with the location and affordability
of housing.
The sense that legal and political institutions have
failed to keep up with the economic, social, and ecological
existence of regions drives the second and third components
of regionalism-the call for regional policies that reflect
regionwide concerns, and the interest in creating new
region-level mechanisms that can take a regionwide
perspective with respect to issues that affect the region.
The second component-the desire for regional instead
of purely local policies-is reflected in the many proposals
concerning land use planning, economic development,
affordable housing, the financing of public services, and the
protection of the regional environment. Many of these
proposals would leave local powers and structures in place,
but through a combination of incentives or requirements
that local actions conform to regional standards, would
superimpose on local decision-making regional goals or
norms concerning such matters as the management of new
growth, the allocation of affordable housing, or the sharing
of the local revenue gains from new property tax base
growth.
10. Henry G. Cisneros, Regionalism: The New Geography of Opportunity, 85
NAT'L Cmc REV. 35, 37-38 (1996).
11. Oliver Williams, Life Style Values and Political Decentralization in
Metropolitan Areas, 48 SOuTHWESTERN. Soc. Sci. Q. 299, 304-07 (1967).
12. Scott A. Bollens, Fragments of Regionalism: The Limits of Southern
California Governance, 19 J. URB. AFF. 105, 118 (1997).
20001
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The third component of regionalism is the interest in
creating new mechanisms that would be able to articulate
regional concerns and formulate and implement regional
policies. Regional policy-making does not necessarily
require regional institutions. Policy proposals can come
from existing localities, from private groups or individuals
operating within existing localities, or from loose collections
of different groups from different localities. Growth
management or tax base sharing can be implemented by
the state, without the creation of new regional bodies. Many
proponents of regional policies see the need for a new, more
regional focus to local policymaking, but are wary of placing
proposals for regional governance structures on their
reform agendas. The long and largely unsuccessful history
of efforts to create metropolitan governments 13  has
persuaded some regionalists that governance reform is
doomed to failure.' Yet, while much of contemporary
regionalism is focused on policy, the governance concern is
a persistent thread in regionalist proposals. Proposals for
full-fledged regional governments are rare,15  but
regionalists regularly call for new regional processes,
structures, or institutions that can identify regional
problems, formulate regional solutions, implement those
solutions, and coordinate regional actions over a wide range
of policy domains. 6 These proposals range from reliance on
13. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in
Metropolitan Areas, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1115, 1117-20 (1996).
14. See, e.g., DAvID RUSK, INSIDE GAME/OUTSIDE GAME: WINNING STRATEGIES
FOR SAVING URBAN AMERICA 8-11 (1999) [hereinafter INSIDE GAME/OUTSIDE
GAME] (commenting that given the unlikelihood in most regions of a regional
government, the focus instead should be on regional land use planning, fair
share housing, and revenue sharing.); William Dodge, Regional Excellence, 85
NAT'L Cmc REV. 4, 5 (1996); Todd Swanstrom, Ideas Matter: Reflections on the
New Regionalism, 2 CITYSCAPE: J. POL'Y DEV. & RES. 5, 15 ("Clearly, the age of
general-purpose regional governments is past.").
15. David Rusk's CITIES WITHOUT SUBURBS, was such a call. Rusk urged the
consolidation of existing metropolitan area local governments, or annexation by
the central city in the region, as the best means of achieving his metropolitan
policy goals of reducing racial segregation, remedying interlocal fiscal
imbalance, promoting regional economic development, and implementing
regional growth management: "Having a metropolitan government is much
better than trying to get multiple local governments to act like a metropolitan
government. The former is a more lasting and stable framework for sustained,
long-term action." RUSK, supra note 4, at 85.
16. See, e.g., MYRON ORFIELD, METROPOLITICS: A REGIONAL AGENDA FOR
COMMUNITY AND STABILITY 99-103 (1997); Allan D. Wallis, Regions in Action:
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coalitions of business leaders, 17 or on cross-sectoral alliances
of public-private and public-private-nonprofit
organizationsj" to the use of regional councils of local
governments, 19 or regional coordinating councils that would
have power to provide funds for local development projects
that are consistent with regional policies,2" and the creation
of an elected metropolitan council with powers to make land
use and development policies for the region.2' Although
regional institutions will not necessarily be effective
advocates of the regional perspective,2" regions will require
some mechanisms for considering regional issues, debating
regional problems, and articulating regional views if
regional policies are to be representative of and responsive
to the concerns of regional residents.
B. Why Regionalism?
After a long period in which regionalism seemed dead,
there was a striking upsurge of interest in regionalism in
the 1990s. 23 The current attention to regionalism has three
strands: a concern about sprawl, a recognition of the
concentration of poverty within metropolitan areas, and a
Crafting Regional Governance Under the Challenge of Global Competitiveness,
85 NAT'L CiviC REV. 15, 18 (1996).
17. See Wallis, supra note 16, at 19-21.
18. See id. at 21-22.
19. See, e.g., J. Eugene Grigsby 1H, Regional Governance and Regional
Councils, 85 NAT'L Civic REV. 53 (1996).
20. See ELMER W. JOHNSON, CHICAGO METROPOLIS 2020: PREPARING
METROPOLITAN CHICAGO FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 95-101 (1999) (proposing area
Regional Coordinating Council for Chicago); cf. INSmE GAME/OUTSmIE GAME,
supra note 14, at 201-21 (discussing Dayton area program involving the use of a
regional advisory committee to allocate finds for economic development projects
in the region).
21. See ORFIELD, supra note 16.
22. See id. at 123-24, 178-80 (reviewing the mixed record of the Twin Cities
Metropolitan Council); cf. Kathryn A. Foster, Regional Capital, paper presented
at the 1998 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, at 17
(noting that the existence of regional institutions such as special districts is not
a good predictor of regional policy outcomes) (on file with the Buffalo Law
Review).
23. See, e.g., Bruce Katz & Scott Bernstein, The New Metropolitan Agenda:
Connecting Cities and Suburbs, BROOIuNGS REV., Fall 1998, at 4, 5; Janis
Purdy, Introduction, 85 NAT'L CiviC REV. 3, 3 (1996) ("regionalism is a hot issue
in the 1990s"); Allan D. Wallis, Filling the Governance Gap
http'J/www.citistates.com/Wallis.htm (collected Jan. 12, 2000 (reviewing recent
books by "the new regionalists")) (on file with the Buffalo Law Review).
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belief that regions will be hampered in their ability to
engage in economic competition unless they address their
internal economic and social inequities.
First, there is the growing dissatisfaction with the
dominant pattern of metropolitan area land use: sprawling
low-density development. In nearly all metropolitan areas,
the growth in the amount of urbanized land has wildly
outpaced the growth in population.24 Over the last quarter-
century, the population of the New York metropolitan area
grew five percent, but the developed land in the region
increased by sixty-one percent;25 similarly, in the 1970s,
metropolitan Chicago's population grew just four percent
while its urbanized territory expanded forty-six percent.21
The extension of metropolitan areas consumes open space
and degrades environmentally sensitive areas, displacing
land uses that contribute to the regional quality of life.
Spreading metropolitan areas create a demand for
expensive new infrastructure-highways and streets,
sewage treatment facilities, fire stations, schools-in
growing communities on the urban fringe.27  Sprawl
contributes to the dispersed pattern of regional
development that effectively precludes the use of mass
transit,2 and leads to the loss of many of the social,
cultural, and civic benefits that could occur if it were easier
for people to come together at central points to discuss
matters of community concern.
The existing local governance system contributes to
sprawl. Local governments are largely dependent on the
taxation of property within local borders for their revenues,
much as they are largely dependent on local revenues to
fund local services. As a matter of local fiscal policy, each
locality has an economic interest in using its planning and
zoning powers to exclude new residents and activities that
cost more in services than they contribute to the tax base.
Local land use regulations can be used to drive up the cost
24. See, e.g., INSIDE GAME/OuTSIDE GAMiE, supra note 14, at 66-69.
25. See NEAL R. PEiECE, CITISTATEs: How URBAN AMERICA CAN PROSPER IN A
COMPETITIVE WORLD 28 (1993).
26. See id.
27. See id. at 132 (noting the "immense public cost" of duplicative
infrastructures on the metropolitan fringe).
28. See, e.g., ANTHONY DOWNS, NEW VISIONS FOR METROPOLITAN AMERICA 8
(1994); Elliott D. Sclar & Walter Hook, The Importance of Cities to the National
Economy, in INTERWOVEN DESTINIES, supra note 6, at 57.
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of housing in a locality, thereby creating a de facto price of
entry that serves to exclude potential residents who would
not add to the net per capita wealth of the community.29
Local decisions to restrict or exclude particular land uses-
like apartment houses, townhouses, or even smaller
detached houses-or to drive up the cost of land, as by
making large lots a precondition for building, will displace
less affluent people to other localities."0 Although an
individual locality is unlikely to be able to affect the
regional housing market, local land use controls can have a
ripple effect across the region. When one locality acts to
exclude lower-cost housing, its neighbors may feel
compelled to adopt comparable regulations to protect
themselves from the growth they fear will be diverted to
them by the initial locality's regulation. As a result,
exclusionary zoning can spread throughout a metropolitan
area, driving up the cost of housing and denying less
affluent people the opportunity to live in large numbers of
communities within the region.
Exclusionary zoning forces new development away from
existing partially developed communities to the exurban
and rural communities at the perimeter of the region.3 This
leapfrog pattern of development results from local fiscal
zoning. People who cannot afford housing in more
restrictive closer-in communities move to less restrictive
outlying areas, and this, in turn, creates sprawl. To be sure,
local land use regulation is not the sole, or even the prime,
cause of sprawl. New developments in transportation and
improved communications technologies have reduced the
benefits of central location, while the increased role of
information rather than physical inputs in production has
loosened the ties of particular firms to particular places,
freeing them to relocate to cheaper locations on the
metropolitan periphery. Federal subsidies for highways and
new suburban infrastructure,32 the failure to price the true
29. They can also use targeted tax cuts, service provision, eminent domain,
or land use regulations to attract firms and residents that add to the local tax
base.
30. See, e.g., ORFIELD, supra note 16, at 58-62 (reviewing locally created
barriers to affordable housing).
31. See, e.g., Lawrence Katz & Kenneth T. Rosen, The Interjurisdictional
Effects of Growth Controls on Housing Prices, 30 J. L. & ECON. 149 (1987).
32. See, e.g., INSEDE GAME/OUTSIDE GAME, supra note 14, at 91-92.
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costs of driving,33 and federal tax benefits and mortgage
guarantees favoring new single-family homes 4 have all
promoted the movement of people and firms away from
older cities and suburbs.35 Nevertheless, the decentralized
and fragmented local government system, which
encourages individual localities to use land use policy to
pursue local fiscal goals, has had an impact." More
importantly, the local government system makes it difficult
for individual localities to take action to control sprawl.
Sprawl is a regional phenomenon: "Therefore, purely local
growth management policies.., cannot succeed without
some strong regionwide mechanism for coordinating
them.""
The second cause of the current interest in regionalism
is the growing concentration of poverty, especially among
African-Americans and Hispanics, in metropolitan areas.
Although metropolitan area incomes are up, and racial
housing segregation has modestly declined, poor people,
particularly poor people of color, are increasingly
concentrated in a relatively small number of high-poverty
census tracts. These neighborhoods, marked by physical
decay and by higher crime, delinquency, drug addiction,
and unemployment rates than are found in the rest of the
metropolitan area, are in "extreme economic and social
33. See PIETRO S. NIVoLA, LAWS OF THE LANDSCAPE: How POLICIES SHAPE
CITIES IN EUROPE AND AMERICA 83-84 (1999).
34. See INSIDE GAME/OUTSiDE GAME, supra note 14, at 86-90.
35. There are also undeniable benefits from sprawl for many metropolitan
area residents. Those benefits include low density residential lifestyles,
relatively easy access to open space both at one's own home and in the
countryside, a broad choice of places to work and live, relatively short
commuting times for most of those who both live and work in the suburbs, ease
of movement except in peak periods, the ability of middle- and upper-income
households to separate themselves spatially from problems associated with
poverty, and their ability to exercise strong influence on their local
governments. Anthony Downs, How America's Cities Are Growing: The Big
Picture, BROOHINGS REV., Fall 1998, at 8. See also Alan A. Altshuler, The Ideo.
logics of Urban Land Use Policy, in DILEMMAS OF SCALE IN AMERICA'S FEDERAL
DEMOCRACY at 193 (Martha Derthick ed., 1999) (suggesting that sprawl is
popular with many metropolitan area residents).
36. See Robert Fishman, Megalopolis Unbound, WILSON Q., Winter 1990, at
25, 36.
37. Downs, supra note 35, at 9.
38. See INSIDE GAME/OUTSIDE GAME, supra note 14 at 71-81, 123-25;
ORFIELD, supra note 16, at 15-45, 156-67.




This concentration of poverty is intertwined with
municipal fiscal distress. High-poverty areas require far
more municipal services than do other areas, yet their
poverty means that they lack the tax base to fund these
services. Taxpayers in localities with high concentrations of
poor people are likely to be subject to higher local tax rates,
but they receive lower quality basic services. The
combination of social and economic distress with high tax
rates and low service quality leads businesses and middle-
income households to move to other areas, "tak[ing] their
fiscal resources with them."4  This increases the
concentration of poverty within the areas they leave, while
further reducing the resources in those areas for financing
local public services. As a result, "a self-aggravating
downward fiscal spiral weakens the ability of core-area
governments to provide quality public services and results
in grossly unequal environments across our metropolitan
areas."42 Although associated with central cities, high
poverty districts are not confined to those cities. In most
metropolitan areas there are older, inner suburbs whose
concentrations of poverty, crime, and fiscal distress exceed
those of the central city.
Sprawl and the concentration of poverty are connected.
Concentrated poverty operates as a "push" factor, causing
those who can leave high poverty areas to do so. Their
efforts to move their businesses and find new housing in
developing areas contribute to sprawl. Conversely, the
availability of commercial and residential sites elsewhere in
the metropolitan area-and the ability to obtain better
services and avoid the higher tax rates of the poorer
localities by moving to new locations-operates as a "pull"
factor inducing people to move. This movement, by reducing
the middle class population in poorer areas, making many
new jobs less accessible to poverty-area residents,' and
weakening the local tax base in those areas, deepens the
impoverishment of poorer localities.
40. Id. at 79.
41. Downs, supra note 35, at 10.
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., ORFIELD, supra note 16, at 66-68 (reviewing the "spatial
mismatch" of new jobs created in the outer suburbs and low-income workers in
the central city and inner suburbs).
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Again, the concentration of poverty in a relatively small
number of metropolitan area census tracts is not a product
solely of the local government system. Much broader
economic and social factors are at work, and a range of
federal policies is implicated.4 But the local government
system contributes to the problem. By linking both the tax
rate and the funds available for local public services to the
local tax base, the local government system assures that
those with the greatest need for services such as education
are likely to receive the worst services, while those
taxpayers in poor areas will have the greatest incentive to
leave those areas, thus contributing to the concentration of
poverty and to the physical and social isolation of poverty
district residents. Local fiscal autonomy also propels local
land use policies, thereby contributing to local exclusionary
regulation. As with sprawl, the consequences of the
concentration of poverty for local taxes and services cannot
be addressed successfully at the local level alone.45
The third, and perhaps the most intriguing, strand in
contemporary regionalism is the belief that a more
regionalist approach to governance is required by the new
global economy.46 This argument from competitiveness
asserts that in today's economy metropolitan regions are
"the units of economic competition,"'7 and that in order to
compete effectively metropolitan areas have to deal with
the social and economic problems of their poorer areas. The
argument relies on studies that demonstrate that
metropolitan areas function as interdependent economic
regions in which there are close relationships between the
central city and the surrounding area.48
These studies find that as interlocal disparities in
household income rise, the overall economic health of the
44. See INSIDE GAME/OUTSIDE GAME, supra note 14, at 107-21.
45. See id. at 126-51; HELEN F. LADD & JOHN YINGER, AMERIcA's AILING
CITIES: FISCAL HEALT AND T=E DESIGN OF URBAN POLICY (1989); ORFIELD, supra
note 16, at 74.
46. See, e.g., PEIRCE, supra note 25; Theodore Hershberg, Regional
Cooperation: Strategies and Incentives for Global Competitiveness and Urban
Reform, 85 NAT'L CMC. REV. 25 (1996); see also Kathryn A. Foster, Regional
Impulses, 19 J. URB. AFF. 375, 375 (1997) (noting the "pressure of global
competitiveness and regional excellence" in the "rediscover[y]" of regionalism).
47. Hershberg, supra note 46, at 25.
48. See H. V. Savitch et al., Ties That Bind: Central Cities, Suburbs, and the
New Metropolitan Region, 7 ECON. DEv. Q. 341, 342 (1993).
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metropolitan region declines.49 One study of metropolitan
areas by the National League of Cities found that city-
suburb disparities in per capita income correlated
negatively with regionwide employment growth. Those
areas in which income disparities were narrowest were
marked by the greatest overall regional growth, whereas
those areas with above-average income inequality had
lower employment growth or even declines in employment
rates."° A second National League of Cities study found a
correlation between suburban income growth and city
income growth. Although city income growth generally
lagged behind suburban growth, cities and suburbs tended
to move in the same direction, and suburbs did best when
their cities did best.5 Another study of metropolitan areas
in the northeast and north central regions found that "it is
unlikely that a metropolitan area's suburban economic
performance, as measured by income growth, is strong
relative to other suburban areas if the metropolitan area
has declining central city incomes."52
The "high correlation between city and suburban
growth, income, and population"53  suggests that the
metropolitan area is "an economically and socially
integrated urban entity"54 whose various components tend
to rise and fall together. The economically intertwined
nature of localities within a metropolitan area may not be
simply a matter of cities and suburbs. In most metropolitan
areas, most of the people and many of the jobs are located
outside the central city, scattered in localities throughout
the region. Firms draw their workers from multiple urban
and suburban settings. They depend on localities other than
the ones in which the firms are located to educate the next
generation of workers and to provide basic public services
and amenities to workers and their families. To the extent
49. See, H. V. Savitch et al., The Regional City and Public Partnerships, in
IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST: THE 1990 URBAN SUMMIT: WITH RELATED ANALYSES,
TRANSCRIPT, AND PAPERS 65, 67-69 (Ronald Berkman et al. eds., 1992).
50. See LARRY C. LEDEBUR & WILLIAM R. BARNES, CITY DISTRESS,
METROPOLITAN DIsPArIEs AND EcONOMIc GROWTH 14-16 (1992).
51. See LARRY C. LEDEBUR & WILLIAM R. BARNES, "ALL IN IT TOGETHER":
CITIES, SuBuRBs, AND LOcAL EcONOMIc REGIONS 1 (1993).
52. Richard Voith, City and Suburban Growth: Substitutes or
Complements?, FED. RESERVE BANK PHILA. BUS. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1992, at 29.
53. Id. at 27.
54. Peter D. Salins, Metropolitan Areas: Cities, Suburbs, and the Ties that
Bind, in INTERWOVEN DESTINIES, supra note 6, at 149.
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that the more fiscally straitened localities of residence are
unable to provide proper education, policing, sanitation,
and parks to their residents, firms, and the regional
economy as a whole, will bear part of the cost. If the fate of
the more affluent areas within a region is tied to the well-
being of its poorer areas, then the region as a whole may
have an interest in addressing the problems of its more
impoverished communities.
The competitiveness argument for regionalism is
controversial. Although there is evidence that rates of
regional growth are inversely correlated with the severity of
intraregional disparities, correlation is not causation.
Instead of equality facilitating growth, growth may promote
equality. High-growth regions may be more internally equal
because of the trickle-down effects of growth. Low-growth
regions may be more internally unequal not because
inequality hampers growth but because lack of growth
contributes to inequality.55 Nor is it clear that the
connection between regional growth and intraregional
equality is a constant across the country. One study found
that the relationship was particularly significant only in
the Northeast and was much weaker elsewhere.r6
Nevertheless, the competitiveness argument is a
significant one in contemporary regionalism. It explains
much of the support for regionalism among business
groups. It gives greater weight to the ties that link up the
different localities within a region rather than to the forces
that drive them apart. And, consistent with the role of local
self-interest in reinforcing localism, it tries to make a case
for regionalism in terms of the self-interest, albeit the
enlightened self-interest, of even the residents of the high
tax-base, low-density suburbs that appear to benefit most
from the current localist system.
55. See Swanstrom, supra note 14, at 8.
56. See Janet Rothenberg Pack, Metropolitan Areas: Regional Differences,
BROOKEIGS REV., Fall 1998, at 26, 29-30.
57. See, e.g., INSiDE GAMEOUTSmE GAME, supra note 14, at 290-99; Wallis,
supra note 16, at 15-16.
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II. FROM LOCALISM TO REGIONALISM
A. The Case for Localism
Advocates of the decentralization of power to local
governments argue that it promotes allocational efficiency
in the provision of public services, democratic citizenship,
and self-determination by territorial communities.
1. Efficiency. In his contribution58 to this Symposium,
Alex Anas built on the work of Charles Tiebout," and
effectively argued that local autonomy promotes the
efficient provision of public goods and services. This occurs
in three ways. First, local autonomy permits public policy
decisions to match distinctive local conditions. If all political
decisions were taken at a highly centralized level, it would
be difficult to vary policies in light of diverse local needs
and preferences. Centrally determined policies might leave
large numbers of people subject to government decisions
they oppose. Decentralization allows local governments to
tailor services, regulation and taxation to the needs and
desires of their particular constituents.60
Second, in Tiebout's model, if there are many localities
in a given area, and if people are free to relocate from one
locality to another, individuals will be able to select among
different localities, each offering its particular package of
taxes, services, and regulation. A multiplicity of relatively
autonomous localities permits a range of choices and
increases the ease of movement among them, enhancing the
likelihood that one locality will approximate the mobile
"consumer-voter's" preferences.6 People can sort themselves
out by moving, with those having similar preferences for
local public goods, services, and taxes settling in the same
localities and apart from people with different preferences.
Thus, not only can local governments vary their policies in
58. Alex Anas, The Costs and Benefits of Fragmented Governance and the
New Regionalist Policies, 2 PLANNING & MARKETS, Sept. 1999, available in
<http//www-pam.usc.edu> (Feb. 11, 2000) (on file with the Buffalo Law
Review).
59. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL.
& EcoN. 416 (1956).
60. See Anas, supra note 58, at 8 (discussing "variety").
61. Tiebout, supra note 59, at 417.
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light of local preferences or conditions, but also households
can choose among local governments and move to, or
remain in, the locality that offers the package of
government activities that best matches their preferences.
Third, the existence of a large number of localities and
the opportunity for exit give citizens greater control over
their local governments. If local decisions are inconsistent
with a resident's preference, she is not stuck with that
outcome. Instead, she can exit to an adjacent locality.
Indeed, the mere possibility of exit, and the local
government's awareness that local residents can vote with
their feet, operate to constrain local government actions.
The possibility of taxpayer exit and, conversely, the
possibility of drawing in new taxpayers from other
localities, mean that local governments will compete for
taxpayers, much as firms compete for customers. The
resulting interlocal competition checks local taxing,
spending, and administrative inefficiency.
2. Democracy. The second major argument for local
autonomy is democracy. A healthy democracy requires that
its citizens have opportunities to participate in the political
process. Local government provides citizens with
opportunities for participation in public decision-making,
opportunities that are simply unavailable in larger units of
government. Democratic participation is presumably more
possible at the local level, where government bodies and
public officials are more accessible and closer to home than
they are at the state or national level. The costs of
participation in terms of the time, energy, and money
needed to reach out, engage, and persuade other members
of the polity are likely to be lower in smaller, local units
than in larger ones." Participation may also be more
satisfying at the local level. Where the unit is small, each
individual can be heard by and potentially influence a
significant portion of the polity. There is a greater chance
that his or her "action will make a significant difference in
the outcome," that is, that he or she will be effective in
determining local policy, winning local office, or least in
62. See ROBERT A. DAHL & EDWARD R. TUFTE, SIzE AND DEMOcRACY 41-42
(1973).
63. Id. at 41.
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shaping the local debate.
Local democracy is connected to local autonomy. People
will bother to participate in local government decision-
making only if local governments have real power over
matters important to local people.64  Local political
participation thus requires local autonomy, much as local
autonomy advances the prospects for local democracy.
3. Community. A third strand in the argument for
local autonomy is the belief that localities are not simply
arbitrary collections of small groups of people who happen
to buy public services or engage in public decision-making
together. They are communities-groups of people with
shared concerns and values-distinct from those of the
surrounding world and tied up with the history and
circumstances of the particular places in which they are
located. People live in localities, raise their children there,
and share many interests related to their homes, families,
and immediate neighborhoods. Much of the power of the
idea of local autonomy in our legal and political culture
grows out of this connection of government with place-based
association. 5
This is not simply a matter of the efficiency advantages
of making decisions concerning public goods or services at
the local level, or of the democratic possibilities of allowing
people to engage in collective political action at the grass
roots. Rather, the argument from community assumes that
a locality is a place with a particular history, identifiable
characteristics, and a unique identity. If a society values its
distinctive communities, local autonomy is important
because it allows local communities to govern themselves.
B. Localism in the Metropolitan Region
Each of the arguments for localism is seriously
undermined by the regionalization of the conditions for and
the consequences of local government actions in
64. See Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057,
1067-70 (1980).
65. See NICHOLAS K. BLOMLEY, LAW, SPACE AND THE GEOGRAPHIES OF POWER
193 (1994) (stating that localities are "valued not as temporary nodes in a




contemporary metropolitan areas. In the metropolitan
context, the arguments for localism actually begin to make
the case for some kind of region-level policy-making and
governance.
1. Efficiency. Underlying the efficiency case for local
autonomy is the assumption that the costs of local actions
are borne primarily by the acting locality, that is, they are
internalized. Tiebout makes this premise express: in his
model, local government will be efficient only when locally
supplied public services "exhibit no external economies or
diseconomies between communities."66 In metropolitan
areas, however, local actions are frequently marked by
externalities.
Local borders probably always generated some
spillovers, but in the past, when local governments were set
farther apart by unincorporated land, and people focused
more of their activities within the territorial limits of their
particular locality, the spillovers may have been relatively
slight compared to the efficiency benefits of decentralized
decision-making. The spillover problem is more acute in
contemporary metropolitan areas, where local borders
frequently abut each other, and people range widely in their
daily activities across multiple local boundaries. In
metropolitan regions, local governments are sure to
generate externalities. As the example of sprawl indicates,
these may not involve simply the impact of one particular
locality on its neighbor, but may instead be the consequence
of the aggregate of local policies across the region. Local
land use decisions have regional effects, yet "in arriving at
its decisions, the typical locality ignores regional impacts."
' 7
The efficiency model relies heavily on interlocal
mobility in order to work.68 It is interlocal mobility that
enables people to select the community that best matches
their needs, and it is the possibility of mobility that gives
rise to the interlocal competition that promotes efficiency.
Yet, in contemporary metropolitan areas, a critical local
land use policy, exclusionary zoning, operates to increase
66. Tiebout, supra note 58, at 419.
67. Altshuler, supra note 35, at 193.
68. See GORDON CLARK, JuDGEs AND THE CITIES: INTERPRETING LOCAL




the cost of mobility, if not to frustrate it outright. It denies
many people the opportunity to move into a place, because
they cannot afford the higher housing costs produced by
local regulation. These people may be able to move, but
because of local regulations they must pay more or move to
locations other than those they would have chosen.
Metropolitan area exclusionary zoning flows from the logic
of local fiscal autonomy, but it constrains the mobility that
is at the heart of the efficiency case for localism.
Finally, the enormous disparities in tax bases and
spending among localities in a metropolitan area69 call into
question the role of localism in promoting "consumer
choice." ° The efficiency argument for local autonomy
assumes that the tax, service, and regulatory differences
among localities are the result of variations in "tastes." In
theory, the people of one locality might prefer a municipal
swimming pool, another might favor a golf course, a third
might opt for higher teacher salaries, and a fourth might
decide to lower taxes and spend less across the board. In
fact, however, local taxing and spending decisions are often
based not on idiosyncratic local tastes but on the stark
differences in local fiscal capacity that divide localities
within a metropolitan area. Moreover, much of the
difference in local tax bases is due to the location of
commercial and industrial activity, to historic settlement
decisions, to the location of highways and natural resources,
or to concentrations of the poor rather than to local
government efficiency. Even a leaner, more effective
government is likely to be incapable of offsetting the
disadvantages of poor location, aged infrastructure, or a
large, impoverished population. Residents of these poorer
locations will have fewer choices, not more, as a result of
local fiscal autonomy.
Thus, in metropolitan areas, a purely localist
governance structure will fail to provide some of the critical
elements of the efficiency model, such as the avoidance of
spillovers, the freedom of people to choose their area of
residence, and the ability of local governments to respond to
the desires of their residents for quality public services.
69. See ORFIELD, supra note 16, at 163 (the wealthiest school district in the
Chicago area has 28 times the tax base per household as the poorest district
and the disparity in annual spending per pupil is three to one).
70. See Anas, supra note 58, at 8.
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Some regional policies or structures will be needed to deal
with the external effects of local actions, to constrain local
regulations that impede mobility, and to assure a level
playing field among localities of unequal taxable wealth. In
metropolitan areas, externalities can be avoided, mobility
protected, and the opportunity of poorer localities to make
choices among public services secured only at the regional
level. In the metropolitan context, then, the efficiency
arguments for localism actually indicate the need for some
kind of regionalism.
The efficiency concerns suggest the desirability of a
combination of localist and regionalist policies or
structures. Some localist actions will generate few
externalities. Not all localities engage in exclusionary
regulation, and not all restrictions on land use are fiscally
determined. Some local control over tax levels and service
decisions would be necessary if localities are to
accommodate the differences in preferences that no doubt
exist across sprawling metropolitan areas. The efficiency
argument suggests the need for regional policies or
structures that can develop norms or guidelines for local
decisions; review and veto local decisions that impose
unacceptable costs on neighboring localities or on the region
as whole, or at least provide a mechanism for obtaining the
consent of and providing compensation to those who are
adversely affected by local decisions; and provide poorer
localities with a share of regional resources so that a
broader range of localities will have the fiscal capacity to
provide the services their residents want. Yet, these policies
or structures could leave many of the basic decisions
regarding land use, housing, economic development, tax
rates, or public service spending to local governments in the
first instance. Regionalism need not wholly displace
localism, but the efficiency argument for localism suggests
the desirability for some form of regionalism to assure that
in metropolitan settings local policies actually promote
efficiency.
2. Democracy. One central value of democracy is that
it enables the people affected by government decisions to
participate in the processes by which those decisions are
made. Democracy assumes a considerable degree of political
equality, that is, of the equal right of those affected by a
government's action to participate and be heard. A local
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government that permitted only some of its residents to
participate in local politics or that gave greater weight to
the participation of some over others would fail the basic
standard of political equality." The pervasive externalities
that undermine the efficiency case for localism, however,
mean that many people affected by a local government's
action live outside the locality's borders. Local government
land use decisions, in particular, regularly affect people
outside local borders who are unable to participate in that
decision-making process. Exclusionary zoning or local
regulations that keep out locally undesirable but regionally
necessary facilities frequently affect nonresidents of the
acting locality. When localities compete for commercial and
industrial taxpayers, local decisions to offer tax breaks or
new, subsidized infrastructure to attract these desirable
potential residents can have negative effects on residents of
other areas who have no right or opportunity to participate
in the local decision-making process. The extralocal
consequences of local decisions, thus, not only cause
inefficiency, but they also undermine the assumption that
local actions are democratic.
A second assumption in the democratic case for localism
is that local autonomy promotes the sense of citizen
effectiveness, that is, that the decentralization of power
creates units small enough for the individual to have an
impact. In the metropolitan area, however, this argument is
undermined by the more limited ability of many local
governments to effectively address critical issues of local
significance. Local issues like sprawl, the adequacy of local
tax bases to local service needs, and economic development
may not be capable of successful resolution at the local
level. The individual may have a larger role in the
formulation of local policies, but in the metropolitan context
purely local decisions may be powerless to solve many
critical problems. Thus, as with efficiency, the democracy
argument actually supports the case for some form of
regionalism. In metropolitan areas, democracy requires
giving the regional electorate a voice in local decisions that
have regional consequences. Only by widening the scale of
participation to include all of those affected by local actions
can local decision-making in metropolitan regions be made
71. See Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968) (applying one person,
one vote doctrine to general-purpose local governments).
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truly democratic. Similarly, action on a regional scale may
be necessary to address effectively social, economic, or
environmental problems that are regional in scope, and,
thus, to make political participation seem worthwhile.
The democracy argument, as well as the efficiency
model, suggests the value of a combination of localist and
regionalist policies and institutions rather either a totally
fragmented localist system or the consolidation of all local
government decision-making at the regional level. Because
not all local decisions have extralocal consequences, local
governments should have power to address purely local
matters. Even for regional matters, local decision-making
can play an important role in adapting regional norms to
different local settings, and local institutions can provide a
framework for the development of views about regional
matters. Regionalism does create a problem of scale. The
sheer size of many metropolitan regions will make it
difficult for residents to participate at the regional level.
Local institutions can provide residents with a critical
forum for the initial discussion of regional problems and a
setting for political organization to deal with regional
decisions. Democracy requires both grass-roots
participation and accountability to the regional electorate
interested in and affected by local actions.
An ongoing dialogue between the local and the regional
will be necessary to advance the value of democratic
participation in public decision-making in metropolitan
areas. But given the current entrenchment of local decision-
making and the virtual absence of regional policy-making,
the significance of the democratic argument for localism in
the metropolitan context is that it plainly calls for the
creation of some regional processes, structures, or
institutions so that the voice of the regional electorate can
be heard.
3. Community. The argument from community
assumes that localities are not simply the land and people
contained by artificial lines on a map, but are, instead
place-based associations of people who closely interact with
each other, have common interests and concerns, and are in
some sense bound to each other. In many major
metropolitan areas, however, localities are not communities
within the traditional sense of the term. They are not the
focal points for most of the activities of their residents, that
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is, the place where residence, business, friendship, family,
and social activities converge. Rather, residents typically
live, work, shop, and go to school in different localities.
Most metropolitan localities lack their own distinctive local
economies72 and town centers,73 much as their residents lack
"geographic rootedness"74 and the sense of shared history
and tradition that are part of the notion of community. Only
the metropolitan area includes most of the daily activities
and social and economic concerns of the residents of a
metropolitan area.
Of course, the metropolitan area is hardly a community
in the romantic sense of a group of people who feel closely
bonded to each other. The enormous territorial scale of the
metropolitan region and the heterogeneity of the
metropolitan population make the frequent, close
interactions and the shared values necessary for the sense
of community difficult to achieve. Metropolitan area
residents may be economically interdependent and have
common interests in such matters as the regional
infrastructure, environment, and economy but this is often
not enough to create the sense of shared fate associated
with the notion of community. Neither the locality nor the
metropolitan area may be a true community in the strong
sense of the term.
To a considerable extent, the existing localist structure
makes recognition of the metropolitan community more
difficult. By tying political participation, services, taxes,
and land use regulation to existing local governments,
localism makes localities the focus of their residents'
loyalties, concerns and identities. With local borders
narrowing their range of vision, residents of one locality
may not recognize that they are affected by the actions of
other local governments or have a stake in the well-being of
residents of other localities in the metropolitan area.
Instead, local boundaries limit the scope of residents'
concerns and create a psychological separation among
metropolitan area localities that is far more difficult to
bridge than physical distance alone. The existing localist
structure promotes interlocal conflict and exacerbates
72. See JAMEs HOWARD KUNSTLER, THE GEOGRAPHY OF NOwHERE: THE RISE
AND DECLINE OF AMERICA'S MAN-MADE LANDSCAPE 186 (1993).




divisions within the metropolitan area, thereby making it
more difficult for metropolitan regions to recognize their
areas of shared interest and interdependence.
The argument from community does not provide
unambiguous support for regionalism. To be sure, the
weaker sense of community within localities in a
metropolitan area weakens the communitarian case for
localism. Moreover, the extent of regular interactions across
the metropolitan area, the shared environment, and the
tentative evidence of economic interdependence suggest
that, objectively speaking, the metropolitan area forms a
kind of community that needs legal recognition so that it
may act on its own behalf to address its problems. However,
most metropolitan areas seem to lack the subjective sense
of community-the "empathy and commitment to the
common good"' that make people feel they are part of a
community.
Perhaps the real connection between community and
regionalism is not that a metropolitan region is a
community and therefore ought to have regional policies
and regional governance, but that some regionalist policy-
making and governance is necessary to create the sense of
regional community necessary to address regional
problems. Metropolitan regions will require a sense of
metropolitan community if they are to tackle questions of
regional land use regulation, the protection of the regional
environment, the availability of affordable housing, the
spatial concentration of poverty and its consequences, and
interlocal fiscal and service inequalities. Regional growth
management laws, regional tax-base sharing, or regional
governing councils would be not simply a means of allowing
the regional community to control its collective fate, but
also a means of bringing the regional community into being.
4. Equality. Equality is not an argument for localism,
but a concern about equality drives much of the argument
that regionalism is really an extension of localism for
metropolitan areas. The central failings of localism in
metropolitan areas are that its efficiency and democracy
benefits are not equally available to all metropolitan area
residents, and that, as a result, it treats the residents of
poorer localities as less than equal members of the




The existing localist structure reflects and reinforces
economic and social inequalities.76 As was previously noted,
mobility is at the heart of the Tiebout model. The ability to
relocate from one place to another within the metropolitan
area is said to enhance "consumer choice," to promote
competition, and to protect local residents from their
governments. But mobility is not equally available to all
local residents. Interlocal movement can be costly. There
are out-of-pocket costs of searching for a new place to live,
and of picking up and moving oneself and one's family.
There are psychic costs of uprooting oneself from a
neighborhood and leaving friends, family and neighbors
behind. Moreover, most people can reside only where they
have access to work. Thus, corporate investment decisions,
local zoning regulations, and transportation policies that
determine the location of jobs, roads, and the costs of
commuting from home to workplace all affect ease of
movement. Poorer, less educated potential movers will have
fewer options and will be forced to bear more costs if they
attempt to move. Similarly, people can reside only where
they can afford to reside. For many potential movers,
exclusionary zoning sharply limits the range of residential
choices.
Mobility is not equally available to all members of the
metropolitan area. In general corporations are more mobile
than are people. Affluent people are more mobile than are
poor people. People without children may be more mobile
than families with children. Moreover, localities tend to
deploy their powers-land use regulation, taxing, and
spending-to recruit the more mobile groups that are also
likely to make a greater contribution to the local tax base
than they cost in local services. As a result, the benefits of
the localist system are unequally available to members of
the metropolitan area, with corporations and the affluent
more likely to benefit than everyone else.
The localist system gives enormous significance to the
differences in local tax bases and the spatial location of
local problems. With property wealth and service needs
unevenly distributed throughout the region and greater
property wealth per household generally concentrated in
areas of lower need, there are profound interlocal taxing
76. See, e.g., Altshuler, supra note 35, at 225.
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and spending inequalities. More affluent localities do very
well under this system, but poorer localities do not. The
localities whose people are in greatest need are simply
unable to meet the needs of their residents or to compete for
the tax base that would enhance their fiscal capacity. Some
forms of regionalism-such as regional fair-share housing
77
or regional tax base sharing7 -are necessary simply to
assure the more equal treatment of people and localities
within the metropolitan region. Only by giving the region
some form of legal and political existence can people act
below the state and national level to attend to the
education, public safety, housing, and employment needs of
residents throughout a metropolitan area.
III. THE PROSPECTS FOR REGIONALISM
Although the values that support localism, and the
concern that the benefits of localism ought to be equally
available in local governments throughout the metropolitan
area provide a theoretical support for regionalism, in
practice localism and regionalism tend to be in conflict.
Localism is deeply entrenched in our legal and political
system, and, despite the steady growth of metropolitan
areas as economic, social, and ecological units, regionalism
has made relatively little headway in the policies and
governance that affect metropolitan areas. New arguments
for regionalism are being developed, new alliances have
been formed, and regionalist initiatives have met some
successes in places like Portland, Oregon, and the Twin
Cities. However, in most areas regional policies concerning
such crucial questions as growth management, exclusionary
zoning and tax base equity are missing, and regional
governance structures, other than those related to physical
infrastructure, are absent. Some places may even be
stepping back from the limited regionalism they practice, as
New York State's abrupt, recent elimination of New York
City's commuter income tax suggests.79
77. See, e.g., INSIDE GAMEOUTSME GAME, supra note 14, at 178-200
(discussing Montgomery County, Maryland's moderately priced dwelling unit
policy).
78. See ORFIELD, supra note 16, at 143-44 (discussing Minnesota's Twin
Cities fiscal disparities law); INSIDE GAMFWOUTSmE GAm, supra note 14, at 201-
21 (discussing voluntary tax base sharing in metropolitan Dayton, Ohio).
79. See N.Y. LAWS of 1999, Chap. 5.
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Although arguments from efficiency, democracy and
community provide the rhetoric for contemporary localists,
the resistance to regionalism in the political process is
largely a matter of the self-interest of those who benefit
from the status quo, such as local elected officials," land
developers,8' corporations that are the subjects of interlocal
bidding, and the businesses and residents located in the
high-tax base localities of the metropolitan area. Localism
in practice is often less about efficiency, democracy, or
community than about preserving existing political control
over local resources, protecting residents of high-wealth
localities from the needs of their lower-wealth neighbors,
and providing opportunities for businesses to take
advantage of the interlocal competition for tax base.
Indeed, in apparent response to the self-interest that
drives localism, contemporary regionalists have come to
give 8greater weight to arguments from self-interest as
well.8 The argument from global economic competitiveness
is really an attempt to persuade regional residents, and
especially the businesses and residents located in high-
income areas, that they, too, would benefit from a more
regionalist structure and that it is in their self-interest to
help address the problems of poorer localities within the
region, especially those of the central city. Myron Orfield
has developed a different, more confrontational, argument
from self-interest. He has sought to persuade the residents
of older declining suburbs, who traditionally have resisted
regionalism and have looked to localism as a means of
preserving their political distance from the central cities,
that regionalism, particular regional fair-share housing
regulation and regional tax-base sharing is in the self-
interest of those communities.8
The central role of self-interest in the determination of
whether metropolitan areas will have a localist or more
regional shape is certainly not surprising, nor is it
80. See, e.g., INSIDE GAmE/OUTSIDE GAME, supra note 14, at 312-15 (noting
the lack of involvement of central city mayors, whose cities suffer under the
status quo, in regionalism).
81. See, e.g., Altshuler, supra note 35, at 193.
82. See, e.g., Foster, supra note 46, at 398 ("Mutual benefit, not altruism
governs regional outcomes. [Blargaining parties, strong and weak alike, must
be made no worse off by new regional outcomes or such outcomes will not
occur.").
83. See ORFIELD, supra note 16, at 108-09, 168-69.
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necessarily distressing. It is reasonable for people to make
decisions concerning public policy and government
structure by trying to determine the likely impact of those
decisions on their interests. Nor is it uniquely American, as
Professor Petersen's analysis in this Symposium of the long
and difficult effort to create a relatively modest form of
regional planning in the Toronto metropolitan area
demonstrates.' It does, however, make it difficult to assess
the prospects for regionalism.
As the uncertainty about the extent of intraregional
interdependency indicates, it is simply unclear whether the
localities within a region rise and fall together. Despite the
studies that have found evidence of city-suburb linkages, it
is far from certain whether the future economic successes of
the more affluent localities in the region-what Orfield
calls the "favored quarter"85 require that they help address
the social and economic problems of areas of concentrated
poverty within the region."
Self-interest also is not entirely a matter of objective
data concerning income levels and employment rates.
Central city officials and residents who would benefit from
some forms of regionalism, such as tax base sharing, might
be leery of regional initiatives that seem to threaten the
autonomy of their communities or weaken their political
voices.87 This is particularly likely where the central city
has a black or Hispanic majority, but where the regional
majority is white.8 Regional development initiatives,
regional growth controls, and regional fiscal equalization
may improve the overall economic well-being of a
metropolitan area but that argument is likely to have
84. Patricia Petersen, Co-operating with the Neighbors: Regional Planning
in Hamburg and Toronto, 48 BuFF. L. REv. 39 (2000).
85. ORFIELD, supra note 16, at 5-9 (using a term developed by real estate
consultants for the portion of the metropolitan area most successful in
attracting expensive housing and/or commercial and industrial property with
low service demands).
86. Indeed, Foster suggests that uneven levels of growth within a region are
likely to be a source of intraregional conflict rather than a spur to regional
cooperation. See Foster, supra note 46, at 378.
87. As Althsuler notes, "most voters, nearly all of the time, seem to conclude
that they are better off with a strong voice in neighborhood decisions than a
nearly inaudible voice in regional or statewide decisions." Altshuler, supra note
35, at 211-12.
88. See ORFIELD, supra note 16, at 169; john a. powell, Race and Space:
What Really Drives Metropolitan Growth, BROOKINGS REV., Fall 1998, at 20.
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purchase with metropolitan area residents only if they view
themselves as part of a metropolitan area, with concerns in
common with residents of other areas in the region, and not
simply as members of their own local units. Older suburbs
that might benefit from tax base sharing or regional growth
management may still be reluctant to cede to a regional
authority their power over land development89 or to link
themselves politically with the central cities." In order for
these older suburbs to become regionalists their residents
must cease viewing the central cities as fiscal drains on
suburban resources and must begin to perceive that what
unites them with the central cities is more important than
what divides them.9 Such perceptions of regional self-
interest are not impossible. Developments in places like
metropolitan Portland, Oregon, metropolitan Seattle and
the Twin Cities metropolitan area suggest that it is possible
to think in terms of a regional self-of a regional
community. But those examples are relatively rare in
American metropolitan areas.
The real challenge for regionalism as we enter the
twenty-first century, then, is not the theoretical arguments
for localism. Those, as I have suggested, actually tend to cut
in favor of regionalism and not against it in our
metropolitan areas. Rather, the fate of regionalism will
turn on whether regionalists will be able to persuade people
that their interests are sufficiently tied in with those of the
residents or other communities within the region. The
political and legal movement from localism to regionalism
89. As Altshuler notes, localities in general are especially resistant to
proposals that would limit their ability to control land development within their
borders. Altshuler, supra note 35, at 202, 210-11.
90. Indeed, Myron Orfield found that he was able to build suburban support
for his Twin Cities area fair share housing proposal only when he was able to
demonstrate to state legislators representing the older, inner suburbs that the
proposal was in their "self-interest." Because it would limit new low-income
housing in their communities, the housing proposal would "protect their
communities from an 'unfair' burden of low-income housing and from future
neighborhood decline." ORFIELD, supra note 16, at 116. "These members were
resigned to the fact that their communities had poor people. They believed that
the high-tax capacity developing communities must also accept their fair share
of poor residents and their accompanying social costs. Otherwise, their older
communities would be overburdened by social needs, and decline would
accelerate." Id.
91. Foster notes that "contrasting perceptions within the region of who is
fiscally exploiting whom... is itself a source of antiregional impulses between
city and suburbs." Foster, supra note 46, at 390.
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will occur only when people believe that they are part of a
region as well as part of a locality, and that their interests
will be advanced by supplementing local governance with
regional policies and political structures that give effect to
those interests and promote the well-being of the region as
a whole and of all the localities within it.
